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THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION
ACT OF 1988: PROPER PENALTIES WHEN
GUILTY EMPLOYEES ARE IMPROPERLY

CAUGHT
Kathleen F. Reilly*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 27, 1988, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of
1988 (hereinafter "EPPA" or the "Act") became law.' It generally

prohibits the use of polygraph examinations 2 by private sector em-

ployers,3 subject to specific exceptions.4 The Act provides a variety of
* Judicial Clerk for the Honorable Howell Cobb of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas; B.A. St. Louis Univ.; J.D. ITT Chicago Kent School of Law.
1. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646
(1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2001-2009 (West Supp. 1989)).
2. The Act defines a polygraph as an instrument that "(A) records continuously, visually, permanently changes in cardiovascular, respiratory, and electrodermal patterns as minimum instrumentation standards; and (B) is used, or the results of which are used, for the
purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual." 29 U.S.C.A. § 2001(4) (West Supp. 1989).
3.
Except as provided in sections 2006 and 2007 of this title, it shall be unlawful for
any employer engaged in or affecting commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce (1) directly or indirectly, to require, request, suggest, or cause any employee or
prospective employee to take or submit to any lie detector test;
(2) to use, accept, refer to, or inquire concerning the results of any lie detector
test of any employee or prospective employee;
(3) to discharge, discipline, discriminate against in any manner, or deny employment or promotion to, or threaten to take any such action against (A) any employee or prospective employee who refuses, declines, or fails to
take or submit to any lie detector test, or
(B) any employee or prospective employee on the basis of the results ofany
lie detector test; or
(4) to discharge, discipline, discriminate against in any manner, or deny employment or promotion to, or threaten to take any such action against, any employee
or prospective employee because (A) such employee or prospective employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this
chapter,
(B) such employee or prospective employee has testified or is about to testify
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penalties for employers who administer polygraph tests' in violation
of its prohibition.6 The Act, however, does not specify which of these
penalties are applicable to an employer who violates the Act, but in
doing so catches an employee who is in fact guilty of some prohibited conduct.
At the time the Act was passed, the vast majority of the polygraph examinations given in the United States were administered in
employment settings by private sector employers. 8 Employers in the
private sector were requiring polygraph tests both as pre-employ-

ment screening devices and as post-employment identification devices
for the administration of employee discipline.9 The use of these polygraph examinations was adversely affecting thousands of innocent
workers per year. 10 The EPPA was the Congressional response to the
unfairness of subjecting a worker to discipline or discharge based
solely upon the results of the inherently unreliable polygraph test."
in any such proceeding, or
(C) of the exercise by such employee or prospective employee, on behalf of
such employee or another person, of any right afforded by this chapter.
29 U.S.C.A. § 2002 (West Supp. 1989).
4. The listed exceptions are found at 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(a) (West Supp. 1989) (government employers); 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(b), (c) (West Supp. 1989) (intelligence or counterintelligence agencies or contractors); 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(e) (West Supp. 1989) (security service employers); 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(0 (West Supp. 1989) (legal manufacturers, distributors,
or dispensers of controlled substances); 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d) (West Supp. 1989) (private
employers with a reasonable suspicion a particular employee is involved in an incident resulting in economic loss).
5. The Act forbids not only polygraph tests but also similar "lie detectors" such as
deceptographs, voice stress analyzers, psychological stress evaluators or other devices that are
used, or the results of which are used, as a means of ascertaining truthfulness. 29 U.S.C. §
2001(3) (West Supp. 1989).
6. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2005 (West Supp. 1989). Penalties include the imposition of fines and
injunction against further polygraph testing, as well as reinstatement, back pay, and attorney's
fees for the adversely affected employee. Id.
7. A polygraph examination measures and records cardiovascular and respiratory
changes in connection with responses to questions asked by the polygraph examiner. S. REP.
No. 284, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 726,
729 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 284]. The examiner then evaluates the record of these physical
responses and determines whether the responses indicate truthfulness or deception. Id.
8. While the polygraph was originally developed as an adjunct to criminal investigations within the law enforcement community, the vast majority of tests today are used as a
screening procedure in private sector employment. Id. at 728.
9. Tests, either preemployment or random post-employment, accounted for much of the
recent increase in testing of employees. Id.
10. One witness testified during hearings on the EPPA that a minimum of 400,000 honest workers annually were wrongfully found deceptive by polygraph examinations, and suffered
adverse employment consequences. See id. at 729.
11. As the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee stated, "the Act's" purpose
is to eliminate the denial of employment opportunities by prohibiting the least accurate yet
more widely used lie-detector tests, preemployment and random examinations, and providing
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The Act prohibits most testing, and establishes guidelines for permitted testing.' 2 Employers who fail to follow these guidelines are subject to a variety of penalties.13 These penalties fall into two categories: (1) actions that are enforced by the Secretary of Labor, such as
injunctions and monetary fines,' 4 and (2) actions which grant relief
to the aggrieved employee or applicant, including reinstatement,
backpay, and other remedies.' 5 A problem arises, however, when an
employer administers a polygraph to an employee in violation of
these restrictions, but as a result successfully catches an employee
guilty of workplace theft or dishonesty. Because it does not specify
which penalties should be imposed upon these employers, the courts
in attempting to enforce the Act are faced with a myriad of questions. Which penalty does the Act prescribe for administering a polygraph in violation of the statute? Is it consistent with the legislative
intent behind the EPPA to use all available penalties if the employer
did in fact take action against a guilty employee? Should the penalties be restricted only to those enforced by the Secretary of Labor,
with no remedy for the aggrieved employee?
This Article will first discuss the Act generally, focusing on the
history and purpose of its ban on lie detector testing.' 6 This Article
will then discuss the problem of the private employer who violates
the Act. I" Finally, this Article will suggest an appropriate penalty to
be imposed upon the employer who improperly administers a polygraph test, but who identifies and disciplines a guilty employee as a
result of the improper test.' 8
II.

THE HISTORY OF POLYGRAPHS AND THE EMPLOYEE
POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT OF 1988

Since the late 1970's, the number of polygraph examinations
given in the United States had risen dramatically. 9 Testimony
standards for and safeguards from abuse during tests not prohibited." Id. at 726.
12. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007 (West Supp. 1989). The rights of the examinee are specified for
the pre-test phase, during the test itself, and during the post-test phase. Id.; see infra notes
100-03 and accompanying text.
13. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2005 (West Supp. 1989). A civil penalty of not more than $10,000

may be assessed, an injunction against continuing violations may be issued, and the aggrieved
employee may seek reinstatement, back pay, costs and attorney's fees. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See infra notes 19-67 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 68-109 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 110-48 and accompanying text.
19. Polygraphs in the Workplace: HearingsReviewing the Use and Abuse of Polygraph
Testing in the Workplace Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
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before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources from
various organizations representing workers estimated that private
sector employers administered approximately two million polygraph
examinations in 1986.20 The number of tests was increasing in spite
of the fact that the American Medical Association (hereinafter
"AMA"), among others, had concluded that a polygraph had as
much chance of truth detection as flipping a coin.21
Polygraphs, by themselves do not, in fact, detect deception.22
Rather they merely measure physiological responses to various questions. The polygraph machine measures and records cardiovascular
and respiratory changes in connection with responses to questions
asked by the polygraph examiner. 23 The examiner then evaluates the
record of these physical responses and determines whether the responses indicate truthfulness or deception. 4
The accuracy of the tests varies depending on the questioning
technique used. 25 The Relevant/Irrelevant (hereinafter "R/I") technique is a questioning method that was primarily used in the preemployment screening context.2 7 There are many problems associ100th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1987) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (containing the statement of
William H. Wynn, International President, United Food & Commercial Workers International Union and Robert F. Harbrant, President, Food & Allied Service Trades Department,
AFL-CIO).
20. Id. at 9 (statement of Ernest DuBester, Legislative Representative).
21. Dr. John F. Beary III, testifying on behalf of the American Medical Association,
told the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources that:
Studies indicate that polygraph tests result in enough false-positive and false-negative findings of truthfulness that their value in the employment as well as the criminal setting should be considered as little better than the probabilities of chance, or
about the same as if one flipped a coin to reach a conclusion.
Id. at 18-19.
22. See Senate Hearings,supra note 19. Representatives of the American Medical Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, and workers organizations, and members of the
legal establishment all testified that there was no scientific basis whatsoever for the validity of
polygraph examinations in employment settings. See id. As the statement of the ACLU noted,
"[i]n fact, since there is no known physiological response that is uniquely identified with the
act of deliberate deception, the polygraph technique is simply invalid." Id. at 171.
23. Council on Scientific Affairs, Council Report-Polygraph, 256 J. A.M.A. 1172
(1986) [hereinafter Council Report].
24. Id.
25. Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation 32,
OTA-TM-H-15, Office of Technology Assessment (1983) [hereinafter OTA Study].
26. In the R/I technique, relevant questions concerning past behavior patterns that an
employer considers vital to a hiring decision are interspersed with irrelevant questions about
which the examinee would have no motive to lie. Id. at 17-18. It is assumed that a deceptive
subject would have a stronger reaction to the relevant questions than to the irrelevant ones. Id.
The assumption is that truthful subjects should have an equal response to all questions because
they are not lying and thus have nothing to fear. Id.
27. See Comment, Specific Incident Testing Under The Employee Polygraph Protection
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with this technique and experts place very little confidence in
ated
it. 28 In response to the inadequacies of the R/I technique a second
technique was developed which has proved to be slightly more reliable when used for specific incident testing.29 This method is known
30
as the Control Question (hereinafter "CQ") technique.

Polygraph examinations of either variety are unreliable for two
reasons. First, the results are entirely dependent upon the subjective

evaluation of the polygraph examiner. 1 The polygraph machine
merely provides a record of the physical responses; the operator must
interpret those responses and give an opinion of truthfulness or de-

ception.32 Second, changes in blood pressure, heartbeat, and rate of
breathing can be the result of influences other than the stress of tell-

ing a lie.3 3 An individual who is frightened, nervous, angry, or physically impaired may truthfully respond to a polygraph test in a manner that can often be interpreted as indicating deception.3 4 Similarly,
there is no way for the examiner to separate individuals who can
35
remain physically calm while lying, from truthful individuals. A
Act of 1988, 64 WASH. L. REv. 661, 663 (1989) (authored by Ryan K. Brown).
28. OTA Study, supra note 25, at 17. The intent of the various questions is usually quite
transparent, therefore, the relevant questions are likely to evoke a strong reaction in truthful
subjects as well as in deceptive ones. Id. Additionally, because the questions usually are not
reviewed by the examinee prior to the R/I method exam, the subjects' responses may be
skewed by surprise or misunderstanding. Id. This method is also more susceptible to errors due
to drugs, personality eccentricities or psychological conditions. Id.; see also Comment, supra
note 27.
29. OTA Study, supra note 25, at 97.
30. The relevant questions under the CQ technique concern specific incidents. Id. at 19
In contrast to the R/I technique, CQ exams, which are much lengthier in duration, include
intentionally ambiguous control questions which involve deviant or nefarious acts almost everyone may have committed at one time or another. Id. The assumption is that virtually all subjects will display anxiety and stress when answering these control questions. Id. The test examiner then compares the reactions to the relevant questions to the reactions from the control
questions. Id. If the reactions to the relevant questions are greater than to the control questions
the subject is diagnosed as being deceptive. Id.
31. As the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources noted, "most examiners
base their conclusion on the conduct of the examinee, the natural inclinations of the examiner,
and on statements made during the examination." S. REP. No. 284, supra note 7, at 729.
32. Comment, Employer-Employee Relations-The Employee Polygraph Protection
Act: Eliminating Polygraph Testing in Private Employment is Not the Answer, I1 S. ILL.
U.L.J. 355 (1987) (authored by Susan M. Flannagan).
33. Senate Hearings,supra note 19, at 3 (containing the statement of Robert Abrams,
Attorney General, State of New York).
34. As Attorney General Abrams said, "whether a person passes or fails the test also
often depends on the state of his or her health. People with breathing or heart problems can
show false reactions to questions and then fail the test." Id.
35. A person with physical problems may exhibit all of the physical reactions an examiner would interpret as indicating deception, regardless of whether he or she was actually telling the truth. Id.
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skilled liar is more likely to indicate truthfulness during a polygraph
test than an innocent person tested for the first time. 36
Nearly fifty bills had been introduced prior to the second session
of the One-hundredth Congress proposing regulation or prohibition
of polygraph testing in employment settings.37 The impetus behind
those bills was the perception that innocent people were either being

denied employment or being discharged from employment because
they failed to pass a polygraph test.38 The Senate Committee on La-

bor and Human Resources heard testimony that hundreds of
thousands of American workers had been adversely affected by erroneous polygraphs. 39 Testimony indicated that many employers were
customarily administering random polygraph tests to employees and
taking disciplinary actions based on the results of these random
tests. 40 Frequently these tests were of very short duration, with random questions intended to elicit general information about an employee or potential employee. 41 These random questions included inquiries regarding any previous thefts and any history of drug use,
but frequently also included inquiries regarding sexual preferences
and personal habits or beliefs. 42 The Office of Technology Assess36. Ironically, polygraph examinations are generally prohibited from use as evidence in
criminal trials. See 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 7a n.35 (Tillers rev. 1983); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 207 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972). The landmark case'refusing the admission of
polygraph
evidence concerning guilt in a criminal trial is Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923). In Frye, polygraphs were barred because there was no adequate demonstration of their
accuracy. See id. But see United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (lth Cir. 1989), in
which the Eleventh Circuit held that polygraph evidence was not inadmissible per se in a
criminal trial. Generallly, however, as one representative commented, "[rlight now, criminals
have more protection from these gadgets than working men and women." 134 CONG. REC.
H3731 (1988) (statement of Rep. Brennan).
37. S. REP. No. 284, supra note 7, at 732.
38. Id. at 726.
39. Senate Hearings,supra note 7, at 8, 9 (statement of Mr. DuBester). According to
Mr. DuBester, polygraph tests are frightening and humiliating; employees have been intimidated into informing on fellow employees, and asked questions regarding family problems,
levels of job satisfaction, sexual preferences, and personal finances, among other topics. Id. Mr.
DuBester estimated hundreds of thousands of innocent workers and applicants had lost jobs
based on polygraph examinations. Id.
40. Id. at 4 (statement of Attorney General Abrams). According to Mr. Abrams, two
New York women lost their jobs at a major department store based on polygraph examinations. Id. One had been at the store twenty-three years, the other twelve-and-one-half years.
Id. They were selected at random to take the test as a control measure, although there had
been no thefts in their departments. Id. They were both discharged by their employer after
failing the random tests. Id.
41. S. REP. No. 284, supra note 7, at 729-30.
42. Such tactics even caused a strike against Coors in 1977. See Comment, supra note
32, at 375. The striking employees claimed that the company was asking questions like: What
are your sexual preferences? How often do you change your underwear? Are you immoral?
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ment (hereinafter "OTA") found that these types of brief polygraph
tests given in the employment setting had no indication of scientific
reliability.4 The control question technique44 used in the majority of
these short tests can show innocent people as guilty as often as 17
percent of the time, with inconclusive results as often as 44 percent
of the time.45
Although opponents of polygraph legislation conceded that
polygraphs were inaccurate, they argued that polygraphs were nevertheless essential because employers were confronted with staggering
economic losses from employee theft. 46 In their view, the level of inaccuracy was simply not sufficient to justify depriving business of
this tool for controlling employee theft.47
Prior to 1988, no bill seeking to ban polygraphs was able to
satisfy those who sought to protect employers from huge losses.
House Bill 1212 (hereinafter "H.R. 1212"), which eventually became the Act, did not, as introduced, address these conflicting perceptions. The bill originally banned any polygraph testing by private
sector employers, with exceptions for particular industries.48 It did
not contain any exception for the employer seeking to control employee theft. Instead, it completely banned the use of polygraphs in
the private sector.49
The House and Senate received extensive testimony on H.R.
1212 regarding the inherent unreliability of polygraph examinations.
A representative of the American Medical Association testified that
innocent people seeking to qualify for employment or to avoid discipline during employment, were extremely likely to be victims of a
"false-positive" test when under the stress of testing.50 A "false-positive" test is a polygraph that is interpreted as showing a subject is
lying or guilty, when the subject is actually telling the truth.51 Other
Are you a homosexual? Are you a communist? inter alia. Id.
43. OTA Study, supra note 25. The brief test does not provide an adequate opportunity
to develop the control questions necessary to get any level of accuracy whatsoever in the examination. See id.
44. See Council Report, supra note 23, at 1173-74.

45. Id.
46.

133 CONG. REC. H9526 (1987) (statement of Rep. Inhofe).

47. Id.
48.

Id. at H9529 (statement of Rep. Taylor).

49. Id.
50. Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 20 (statement of American Medical Association). According to the U.C. AMA, an unacceptable percentage of innocent persons may be
labeled as deceptive in a polygraph screening situation in which most of those screened were

truthful. Id.
51.

Consequently, a "false-negative"'test result occurs when a person is diagnosed as
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testimony indicated as many as four-hundred-thousand Americans
were victims of adverse employment actions based on "false-positive" polygraph test results."2
The problems associated with polygraph examinations were not
ignored by the states however. By the time the Act was passed only

seven states were devoid of any kind of legislation or regulation of
polygraph examinations." Twelve states currently not only prohibit
an employer from requiring a polygraph examination, but also bar
an employer's request of an employee to take one.54 Ten states ban
only a required exam but not a requested one. 5 The other twentyone states have not banned the polygraph's use, but have imposed
various forms of regulation on the polygraph machine and polygraph
examiners. 516
The extensive use of polygraph testing in private sector employment combined with the enormous impact on employment for innocent individuals because of "false-positive" test results finally galvanized the House into action.
H.R. 1212 was passed in the House and sent to the Senate. In
being truthful when in fact he or she is lying. OTA Study, supra note 25.
52. Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 3 (statement of Attorney General Abrams).
53. Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio and Wyoming do
not have any laws concerning the use of polygraphs in employment. See Note, Banning the
Truth-Finder in Employment: The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 54 Mo. L.
REv. 155, 161 n.30 (1989) (authored by Peter C. Johnson). New York does, however, prohibit
the use of psychological stress evaluators by private employers. N.Y. LAB. LAWS. §§ 733-738
(1986).
54. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.37 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51g (1987); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7166 (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 149, § 19B (West 1982); MICH. CoMP. LAWS. § 37.203 (1985); MINN. STAT. § 181.75
(1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 40A-I (West 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.225 (1985); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 28-6-1 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.44.0-.130 (1986); W. VA. CODE § 21-55b (1985).
55. CAL LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1988); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 378-26 to -29 (1986):
IDAHO CODE §§ 44-903 to -904 (1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.4 (West 1988); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 100, § 95 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1932
(1987); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7321 (Purdon 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 494(a)
(1987); WIs. STAT. § 111.37 (1985).
56. ALA. CODE § 34-25 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2701 (1986); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 17-32 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 493.561-.579 (West 1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 845001 to -5016 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 2401-38 (Smith-Hurd 1988); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 25-330-2-1 to -5 (West 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329.010 - .990 (Baldwin
1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37.2831-.2854 (West 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-1 to 47 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 648.005-.210 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-26-1 to -19
(1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 74c-1 to -33 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-31-01 to -17 (1978);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1451-1476 (West 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-53-10 to -250
(Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 36-30-1 to -3 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
62-27-101 to -124 (1986); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29cc) (Vernon 1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 34.27-1 to .37-14 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-916 to -922 (1982).
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the Senate, the bill was amended to provide an exception for employers to request polygraph examinations from employees reasonably
suspected of involvement in employee theft or other incidents resulting in economic loss to the employer. 57 The Senate noted that the
Office of Technological Assessment had concluded polygraph tests
used in specific investigations had some indication of scientific reliability.58 For example, in criminal cases, where the examiner used a
much lengthier test format than that of the typical employer-administered polygraph test, the polygraph had an accuracy rate of 75.1
percent when the subject was guilty, and 63 percent when the subject was innocent.59
Because of this potentially greater reliability, the Senate added
to H.R. 1212 a strictly controlled exemption for employers who
wanted to request polygraph examinations of specific employees
whom the employer suspected of involvement in an incident resulting
in economic loss to the employer.6" One Senator noted, however, that
even in such a situation, the evidence indicated that polygraph examinations were "far from infallible."'" The primary purpose of the bill
continued to be the protection of employees and applicants from adverse employment actions based solely upon the inherently unreliable
polygraph examination. 2
Ultimately, the House passed a Conference Committee version
incorporating the Senate's proposed exception for testing of employees based upon a reasonable suspicion of their involvement in an incident resulting in an economic loss to the employer.63 The House
agreed to the compromise based upon the greater possibility for reliability found by the OTA in polygraph examinations in specific
criminal investigations.6 4 Although polygraphs are not very accurate" even in specific investigations, the need for employers to have
some method of detecting employee theft required some compromise
permitting a limited use of the polygraph. The result of this compromise was a prohibition with an exemption for employers with a reasonable suspicion of a particular employee, namely, the Employee
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

134 CONG. REC. S1796 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
Id.
OTA Study, supra note 25.
134 CONG. REc. S1801 (1988) (statement of Sen Matsunaga).
Id.
Id. (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
S. REP.No. 284, supra note 7, at 736.
134 CONG. REc. H3727 (1988) (statement of Rep. Jeffords).
See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
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Polygraph Protection Act of 1988.66 The EPPA prohibits the use of
polygraphs by private sector employers in both pre-employment
screening settings and post-employment disciplinary proceedings.67

III.

THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT OF

1988

The EPPA does not completely ban the use of polygraphs;
it contains exemptions for specific industries, permitting employers in those industries to administer polygraph tests to
their employees.6 8 Additionally, section 7(d) of the Act provides
an exemption from the ban on polygraph testing for private sector
employers in other industries. 69 A private sector employer may request that an employee take a polygraph test, "in connection with an
ongoing investigation involving economic loss or injury to the employer's business ....,,7o Such a test can only be requested of an
66. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2001-2009 (West Supp. 1989).
67. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2002 (West Supp. 1989).
68. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(a) (West Supp. 1989) (government employers); 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 2006(b), (c)(West Supp. 1989) (intelligence or counterintelligence agencies or contractors);
29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(e) (West Supp. 1987) (security service employers); 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 2006(0 (West Supp. 1989) (legal manufacturers, distributors, or dispenses of controlled
substances).
69. As laid out in section 7 of the Act:
Subject to sections 2007 and 2009 of this title, this chapter shall not prohibit
an employer from requesting an employee to submit to a polygraph test if (1) the test is administered in connection with an ongoing investigation involving economic loss or injury to the employer's business, such as theft, embezzlement,
misappropriation, or an act of unlawful industrial espoinage or sabotage;
(2) the employee had access to the property that is the subject of the
investigation;
(3) the employer has a reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved in
the incident or activity under investigation; and
(4) the employer executes a statement, provided to the examinee before the
test, that (A) sets forth with particularity the specific incident or activity being
investigated and the basis for testing particualar employees,
(B) is signed by a person (other than a polygraph examiner) authorized
to legally bind the employer,
(C) is retained by the employer for at least 3 years, and
(D) contains at a minimum (i) an identification of the specific economic loss or injury to the
business of the employer,
(ii) a statement indicating that the employee had access to the
property that is the subject of the investigation, and
(iii) a statement describing the basis of the employer's reasonable
suspicion that the employee was involved in the incident or activity
under investigation.
29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d) (West Supp. 1989).
70. 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(c)(1) (1989) cites other examples of specific incidents which
would meet the economic loss or injury requirements including check-kiting, money launder-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol7/iss2/4

10

1990]

The Polygraph Act of 1988
Reilly: The Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 1988: Proper Penalties W

employee who "had access to the property that is the subject of the
investigation. . ." and only if "the employer has a reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved in the incident or activity under
investigation ...
71
An employer who falls under the section 7(d) exemption

and wishes to request an employee to take a polygraph must follow certain required steps.

2

That employer must provide the sus-

pected employee with a written notice describing the incident
under investigation, setting forth the basis of the employer's suspicion of the employee,7 3 and advising that employee
that failing the test or refusing to take it cannot alone be the basis for an adverse employment action or a requirement for continued employment.74 According to the regulations, the employee must
be notified

at

least

forty-eight

hours

prior

to

the

sched-

uled examination, 75 "to provide a sufficient opportunity prior to
the examination for the examinee to consult with counsel or
an employee representative.17 6 The Secretary of Labor has pro-

vided a suggested form for this notice. 7
Additionally,

an

employer

who

gives

a

test

based

upon reasonable suspicion must have "additional supporting evidence" before the employer can take any adverse employrhent ac-

tion against the employee who fails or refuses to take the test.78 This
protection is rather illusory, however, since the additional supporting
ing, or the misappropriation of confidential or trade secret information. Similarly, instances
such as theft from property managed by an employer, or property held by an employer as a
fiduciary or custodian, would meet the required injury standard. See id.
71. Id.
72. All employers covered by the Act must post notice of its protections. 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 2003 (West Supp. 1989). This section provides that "the Secretary [of Labor] shall prepare,
have printed and distribute a notice setting forth excerpts from, or summaries of, the pertinent
provisions of this chapter. Each employer shall post and maintain such notice in conspicuous
places on its premises where notice to employees and applicants to employment are customarily posted." Id.
73. See supra note 69.
74. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989); see also 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(1)(i)
(C)(3)(i) (1989).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(1)(i)(A) (1989). This section requires that during the pretest
phase the employee must be provided with written notice, in a language understood by the
examinee, as to when and where the examination will take place and that the examinee has the
right to consult with counsel or an employee representative before each phase of the test. Id.
76. 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(1)(i)(A) (1989). This regulation provides the restriction that
"while an employee has the right to obtain and consult with counsel before each phase of the
test, the attorney or representative may be excluded from the room where the examination is
administered during the actual testing phase." Id.
77. 29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(1)(i)(B) (1989).
78. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(a) (West Supp. 1989).
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evidence allowed includes the evidence which was the basis for the
employer's reasonable suspicion. It also includes any incriminating
statement or confession made by the employee before, or during, the
polygraph examination. s0 The dichotomous result of these provisions
is that an employee who agrees to take a polygraph test, after being
assured it cannot be the basis for an adverse employment action, can
still be disciplined or discharged if he or she fails that test. For example, a merchant discovers some stock has disappeared between
nine o'clock and ten o'clock on a particular morning. An employee
who was on duty during that hour and who had access to the stock
in question agrees to take a polygraph test. During the test she admits that she stole the missing stock. She can then be legitimately
fired by the merchant, based on the incriminating statement she
made during the polygraph examination.
Theoretically, an employer can violate the Act in any one of
three ways: administering a test without reasonable suspicion;8' administering a test based upon reasonable suspicion but failing to follow the required procedure;82 or administering the test properly but
taking adverse disciplinary action without additional supporting evidence.8 3 For example, a retailer who administers a test to all of his
employees when some money is missing from a cash register has no
reasonable suspicion that all of them took the money and has therefore violated the Act. Similarly, a hardware store owner who has a
reasonable suspicion that two particular clerks were involved in the
theft of a case of tools, but fails to give the clerks written notice of
the polygraph examination has also violated the Act. Finally, a grocer who suspects three stock boys of stealing liquor, and properly
administers a polygraph, but then fires all three with no further evidence theoretically has not obtained additional supporting evidence
and has thus also violated the Act.
In practice, however, only two of these violations can
ever occur. An employer who has properly administered the test
based upon a reasonable suspicion cannot violate the Act by taking
an adverse employment action. By definition, the evidence supporting the employer's reasonable suspicion constitutes sufficient additional supporting evidence to justify the ad79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
29 C.F.R. § 801.22(c)(1)(i)(C)(3)(iii)(B) (1989).
29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d) (West Supp. 1989).
Id.
29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
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verse employment action. 84 When confronted with an alleged
violation, the employer can point to the evidence that gave rise to
the reasonable suspicion, since the statute specifies that evidence
as adequate additional supporting evidence.85 The result is that the
only possible violations are administering a test without reasonable
suspicion, or failing to follow the required procedure during the
test.8 6 Consequently, this Article will only deal with appropriate penalties for these two violations.
The EPPA specifies the penalties that may imposed upon an
employer who improperly administers such a test as well as an employee's recourse when subjected to an improper polygraph.8 7 Available remedies include employment, reinstatement, promotion, back
pay, costs and attorney's fees for the aggrieved employee.8 8 The Secretary of Labor may also seek civil fines and injunctions against continuing violations by the employer.8 9 Unfortunately, the Act does not
specify any lesser or different penalty to be imposed upon an employer who violates its provisions, but as a result, disciplines or discharges an employee who is actually guilty of the activity leading to
the economic loss.90
IV. EMPLOYER VIOLATIONS OF THE REASONABLE SUSPICION
EXCEPTION

As was previously mentioned, there are two possible violations
of the EPPA that an employer can commit in connection with the
investigation of a workplace theft. 1 The first is to administer
92
polygraphs to employees in the absence of reasonable suspicion.
The second is to administer polygraphs to reasonably suspected employees, but without following the required procedure.9 3 The first violation occurs when the employer can articulate no rational basis for
suspecting the employee he or she wants tested. The employer is required by the regulations to have "an observable, articulable basis in
84. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
85. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(a) (West Supp. 1989).
86. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007 (West Supp. 1989).
87. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2005 (West Supp. 1989).
88. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2005(c) (West Supp. 1989).
89. An employer who violates any provision of this chapter may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $10,000. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2005(a) (West Supp. 1989); see also 29
U.S.C.A. § 2005 (b) (West Supp. 1989).
90. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
92. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d) (West Supp. 1989).

93. Id.
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fact"94 which indicates that the employee to be tested was involved
in the theft. Access95 to the property that was stolen cannot alone
constitute a basis for reasonable suspicion.9 6 The evidence that the
employer gathers in support of the reasonable suspicion requirement
is the evidence that can be used later as the additional supporting
evidence for disciplinary action.97 When an employer, who has experienced a workplace theft, requests or requires an employee to take
a polygraph test, but can articulate no reasonable basis for suspecting that the employee is involved in the theft, the employer will
be in violation of the Act. 98 The second violation occurs when the
employer does have reasonable suspicion that a particular employee
was involved in a workplace theft, but that employer fails to follow
the Act's procedures for administering the polygraph examination.
For example, the employer may fail to provide written notice to the
employee, 100 or fail to give the employee a list of questions to be
94. The regulations further define this standard:
For example access in the sense of possible or potential opportunity, standing alone,
does not constitute a basis for "reasonable suspicion." Information from a coworker, or an employee's behavior, demeanor, or conduct may be factors in the basis
for reasonable suspicion. Likewise, inconsistencies between facts, claims, or statements that surface during an investigation can serve as a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion. While access or opportunity, standing alone, does not constitute a
basis for reasonable suspicion, the totality of circumstances surrounding the access
or opportunity (such as its unauthorized or unusual nature) may constitute a factor
in determining whether there is a reasonable suspicion.
29 C.F.R. § 801.12(0(1) (1989).
95. The word access as used in section 7(d)(2) of the Act (codified at 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 2006(d)(ii) (West Supp. 1989)) is defined at 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(e)(1) (1989) and refers to:
the opportunity which an employee had to cause, or to aid or abet in causing, the
specific economic loss or injury under investigation. The term "access," thus. includes more than direct or physical contact during the course of employment. For
example, all employees working in or with authority to enter a warehouse storage
area have "access" to the property in the warehouse. All employees with the combination to a safe have "access" to the property in a locked safe. Employees also have
"access" who have the ability to divert possession or otherwise affect the disposition
of the property that is the subject of investigation. For example, a bookkeeper in a
jewelry store with access to inventory records may aid or abet a clerk who steals an
expensive watch by removing the watch from the employer's inventory records. In
such a situation, it is clear that the bookkeeper effectively has "access" to the property that is the subject of the investigation.
29 C.F.R. § 801.12(e)(1)(1989).
96. See 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(f)(1) (1989).
97. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(a) (West Supp. 1989).

98.

PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,

Recent Developments in the Law of Unjust Dismis-

sal, Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series (1988) [hereinafter
PLI].
99. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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asked,""' or ask questions that are forbidden, 102 or otherwise fail to
meet the requirements of the Act. 0 3 Any of the above transgressions

amounts to a violation of the EPPA. 04

An employer's chances of catching a guilty employee are usu-

ally increased by the administration of the polygraph test, because
the polygraph test is an inherently coercive device. The polygraph

has been shown to have a coercive effect on some employees, instilling fear and therefore inducing confessions. 1 05 It has been estimated

that as much as 90 percent of the information a polygraph examiner
obtains during an exam regarding a particular incident is obtained
through pre-examination questioning, before the examinee is even
hooked up to the machine. 0 6 The regulations affirm the coercive potential of the polygraph by providing that statements or confessions

made during the polygraph examination may constitute the additional supporting evidence necessary to support an adverse employment action. 0 7
An employer may be tempted to violate the Act in order to take
advantage of the coercive power of the polygraph examination.
An employer who knows that a polygraph exam is likely to induce a
confession'0 8 may improperly administer one, and, through the exam,
gather the evidence he or she can later claim gave rise to
the reasonable suspicion. It is essential, therefore, that some penalty
101. Section 6 of the Act requires that the employee is to be provided an opportunity to
review all questions to be asked during the test and be informed of the right to terminate the
test at any time. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(2)(E) (West Supp. 1989).
102. The Act provides that:
(B) the examinee is not asked questions in a manner designed to degrade, or needlessly intrude on such examinee;
(C) the examinee is not asked any question concerning (i) religious beliefs or affiliations,
(ii) beliefs or opinions regarding racial matters,
(iii) political beliefs or affiliations,
(iv) any matter relating to sexual behavior, and
(v) beliefs, affiliations, opinions, or lawful activities regarding unions or labor
organizations ....
29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(1)(B), (C) (West Supp. 1989).
103. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007 (West Supp. 1989). Other procedural requirements include disclosing to the employee in writing; all of his or her rights under the Act, whether the
testing area is being observed by a two-way mirror or camera, whether the test is being recorded or otherwise monitored, that either employer or employee may (with mutual knowledge) record the test and, inter alia, that no test shall last for less than 90 minutes. Id.
104. See PLI, supra note 98.
105. Senate Hearings,supra note 19, at 88 (statement of the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO).
106. Id. at 11 (statement of Mr. DuBester).
107. 29 C.F.R. § 810.22(c)(1)(i)(C)(3)(iii)(B) (1989).
108. See supra note 85.
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be imposed upon that employer in order to fulfill the Act's purpose
of protecting innocent employees from polygraph testing. However,
it seems contrary to the legislative purpose of the exception,
the deterrence of employee theft, to allow a guilty employee
to successfully sue for reinstatement, back pay, and attorney's fees.' 09 If the employer is forced to take back a thief, the purpose and effect of the EPPA seems to be undermined. The question,
therefore, is what penalty will deter the employer, while not rewarding the guilty employee.
V.

AN APPROPRIATE PENALTY FOR IMPROPER TESTING
RESULTING IN THE DISCHARGE OF GUILTY EMPLOYEES

This Article proposes that the appropriate penalty for an employer who discharges a guilty employee based upon an improperly
administered polygraph test, is the imposition of a civil fine and an
injunction to prevent further improper testing. This would adequately deter the employer by financially punishing the employer for
the violation of the Act, while at the same time furthering the legislative purpose of protecting innocent employees. "1 0 Additionally, the
discharged employee should not be allowed to pursue reinstatement
or other remedies against the employer. Barring reinstatement will
protect the legislative goal of allowing employers to fight employee
theft by punishing guilty employees.
Tailoring the penalties in this way would satisfy both the Act's
goal of prohibiting the use of the inherently unreliable polygraph,
and the realistic goal of permitting employers to discharge employees
who steal from them. The amount of the civil fine will serve as the
deterrent to the employer's incentive to exploit the coercive potential
of the polygraph. An employer who suffers financial loss because of
his/her indiscriminate use of the polygraph will become more prudent in its use. In the future such employers will utilize the test only
when there is reasonable suspicion of employee theft and will seek to
follow proper procedure when doing so. At the same time, this penalty will not reward guilty employees with reinstatement and back
pay based only upon their employers' violations of the Act. Employees who steal from their employers, but have the luck to be caught
through an EPPA violation by that employer, should not then be
reinstated to steal again. That would be tantamount to slapping the
109. The primary legislative concern was deterrence of employee theft, thus rewarding a
guilty employee seems to undermine that purpose. See supra note 46.
110. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol7/iss2/4

16

1990]

The Polygraph Act of 1988
Reilly: The Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 1988: Proper Penalties W

hand of the boy who caught the fox and tossing the fox back into the
henhouse.
The EPPA is so new that no court has yet ruled on the appropriate penalty in such a situation. State court decisions, as well as
court decisions interpreting Weingarten rights"' provide guidance in
this area. Cases in which state courts have upheld or reversed discharges, or granted or denied unemployment compensation, can be
helpful in defining the public policy surrounding the enforcement of
laws regarding polygraph examinations." 2 Examination of these results against the backdrop of the legislative intent behind the Act
indicates that a punitive, rather than a compensatory, remedy is
proper to truly implement the purposes of the Act. Courts are willing
to punish employers for improper uses of polygraph examinations,
but are not willing to permit guilty employees to obtain compensation for those examinations.
Additionally, decisions from the forty-three states which had
laws regulating the use of polygraphs or the work of polygraph examiners prior to the EPPA's passage can provide assistance in interpreting the proper penalty for an employer who discovers a guilty
employee through an improper polygraph. When the EPPA was
passed, only seven states had no law whatsoever regarding polygraph
examinations." 3 The Act now prohibits polygraphs in the employment setting in those states in which it was previously permitted or
merely regulated. The EPPA does not, however, preempt any state
14
polygraph prohibition which is more stringent than itself.
One group of cases denies recovery under the wrongful discharge cause of action or collection of employment cause of action to
employees discharged because they failed or refused to take a polygraph test. These courts base their decisions on the public policy
against requiring an employer to retain a guilty employee. For example, a federal district court in the state of New Jersey, which statutorily prohibits the use of polygraphs in employment settings, upheld
I 11. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). Weingarten rights are the
rights of employees, under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, to have union representatives present when the employees are questioned regarding facts that may result in disciplinary actions. Id.
112. Since the EPPA is so new, courts' application of state polygraph policies can be
instructive.
113. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
114. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2009 (West Supp. 1989) provides that "this chapter shall not preempt any provision of any state or local law or of any collective bargaining agreement that
prohibits lie detector tests or is more restrictive with respect to lie detector tests than any
provision of this chapter."
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an arbitrator's award sustaining the discharge of an employee based
upon the statements the employee made during a polygraph examination." 5 The court said that the public policy discouraging polygraph tests, embodied in the statute, was outweighed by the public

policy considerations in favor of permitting an employer to discharge
an employee who steals."'
Similar conclusions have been reached by state courts in
Ohio, 7 Illinois, 18 and Florida." 9 The Ohio Appellate Court for
Hamilton County held that an employee who was discharged for refusing to take a polygraph, failed to state a cause of action for
wrongful discharge.' 20 Likewise, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District found no cause of action for wrongful discharge when
an employee refused to take a polygraph examination. 2 ' In Florida,
an employee who agreed to take a polygraph as a condition of employment, and then later refused, was prohibited from collecting unemployment compensation, based on the public policy against requiring an employer to pay unemployment benefits to a possibly guilty
22
employee.'
The Mississippi Supreme Court, with reasoning similar to the
rationale in the Act for exempting certain employers, held that a

police officer can be required to take a polygraph examination or be
dismissed.

23

The court reasoned that the nature of a police officer's

job, involving public safety and protection, made it essential that a
police department be able to use all available tools, including the
polygraph examination. 24 Similarly, in drafting the EPPA, Congress
115. Simpson v. APA Transport Corp., 108 L.R.R.M. 2754 (D.N.J. 1981).
116. Id. at 2758.
117. Walden v. General Mills Restaurant Group, Inc., 31 Ohio App. 3d 11, 508 N.E.2d
168 (Ct. App. 1986)(holding that an at-will employee who was discharged for refusing to take
a polygraph examination did not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge).
118. Cipov v. International Harvester Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 522, 481 N.E.2d 22 (App.
Ct. 1 Dist. 1985) (upholding that an at-will employee can be terminated for any or no reason).
119. Vaughan v. Shop & Go, Inc., 526 So. 2d 91 (Fla. App. 1987)(construing that an
employee who refused to take a polygraph examination after agreeing to submit to such an
examination as a condition of employment was guilty of misconduct under unemployment
compensation law and was therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation
benefits).
120. Walden, 31 Ohio App. 3d at 11, 508 N.E. 2d at 168.
121. Cipov, 134 Il1. App. 3d at 522, 481 N.E. 2d at 22.
122. Vaughan, 526 So. 2d at 91.
123. Knebel v. City of Biloxi, 453 So. 2d 1037 (Miss. 1984)(holding that a municipal
police officer could reasonably be required to submit to a polygraph examination, the scope of
which was restricted to her involvement in an illegal drug investigation, and that she had no
constitutional right to refuse).
124. Id.
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created a specific exception for government intelligence agencies x1 5

and security service employers,126 both of whose employees are involved in public safety and protection activities.

In a decision that was a remarkably accurate prediction of the
parameters of the Act's reasonable suspicion exception, a Georgia

appellate court held that an employee could be required to take a
polygraph if the examination questions were specifically related, and
narrowly tailored, to a specific incident. 127 If the employee was assured the answers could not be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution, 128 refusal to take the test was an adequate basis for discharge

of the employee.' 29
125. Section 5 of the Act states that:
(2) Security Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit the administration, by the Federal Government, in the performance of any intelligence or counterintelligence function, of any lie detector test to(A) (i) any individual employed by, assigned to, or detailed to. the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the Central Intelligence Agency,
(ii) any expert or consultant under contract to any such agency,
(iii) any employee of a contractor to any such agency, or
(iv) any individual applying for a position in any such agency, or
(v) any individual assigned to a space where sensitive cryptologic information
is produced, processed, or stored for any such agency; or
(B) any expert, or consultant (or employee of such expert or consultant) under contract with any Federal Government department, agency, or program whose duties
involve access to information that has been classified at the level of top secret ....
(c). . . an employee of a contractor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the
Department of Justice who is engaged in the performance of any work under contract with such Bureau. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(b), (c) (West Supp. 1989).
126. The Act defines security services as:
[P]rivate employers whose primary business purpose consists of providing armored
car personnel, personnel engaged in the design, installation, and maintenance of security alarm systems, or other uniformed or plainclothes security personnel and
whose function includes protection of(A) facilities, materials, or operations having a significant impact on the health
or safety of any State or political subdivision thereof, or the national security of
the United States ... [including]
(i) facilities engaged in the production, transmission, or distribution of electric or nuclear power,
(ii) public water facilities,
(iii) shipments or storage of radioactive or other toxic waste materials, and
(iv) public transportation, or
(B) currency, negotiable securities, precious commodities or instruments, or
proprietary information.
29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(e)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
127. Moss v. Central State Hosp., 179 Ga. App. 359, 346 S.E.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1986).
128. Id. The Act does not indicate whether statements made by an employee during a
polygraph examination can be used in a later criminal prosecution, but there is no prohibition
of such a use. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009. The actual polygraph itself is probably inadmissible. See supra note 36.
129. Moss, 179 Ga. App. at 359, 346 S.E. 2d at 580.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

19

Hofstra
Law Journal Law Journal, Vol. 7, [Vol.
Hofstra
LaborLabor
and Employment
Iss. 27:2[1990], Art. 4

All of these decisions indicate that the public policy in favor of
permitting the employer to discharge a guilty employee and prevent
employee theft is strong and persuasive. In applying the Act, denial
to the employee of the remedies of reinstatement, back pay, and attorney's fees follows that public policy. 130 Such a denial supports the
employer's right to seek to eradicate employee theft and control the
workplace.
In fashioning a public policy compromise under similar circumstances, the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts
have adopted the view that guilty employees who are discharged in
violation of their Weingarten rights are not entitled to reinstatement.' 3 ' Courts have recognized the public policy in favor of union
representation, but balance it against the public policy against forcing an employer to take back a dishonest worker.' 32 In a Weingarten
situation, an employee is deprived of union representation during an
interview which is later the basis for discipline or discharge. 33 The
violation is similar to a situation where an employee is improperly
given a polygraph examination which is later the basis for discipline
or discharge. In a Weingarten situation, in spite of the fact that the
employer discovered the employee's guilt through improper means,
the employer will not be forced to take back the employee.
At the same time, a strong public policy exists against conditioning employment upon a polygraph examination. For example, the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court upheld the award of unemployment benefits to an employee who quit rather than take a polygraph
examination. 34 The court reasoned that the public policy against
polygraphs in employment settings rendered an employee's rbfusal to
take the polygraph an involuntary quit under the Pennsylvania unemployment statute. 3 5 Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court
ruled that an employee who was fired for refusing to take a polygraph examination had stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge. 13 The public policy against polygraphs in employment was
130. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
131. Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 340 (1981). Taracorp was an abrupt about-face for
the National Labor Relations Board, which had been ordering reinstatement unless the dis-

charge was not based even in part upon information obtained during their proper interview. Id.
132. Communications Workers of Am., Local 5008 v. NLRB, 781 F.2d 817 (7th Cir.
1986); Pacific Tel. & Tel. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1983); Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1981).
133. See supra note I11.
134. Carroll v. Pennsylvania, 2 I.E.R. Cases 1878 (Pa. Commw. 1988).
135. Id. at 1880.
136. Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd., 2 I.E.R. Cases 1185 (Neb. 1987).
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such a clear mandate that the employer's
requirement of a poly3
graph constituted abusive discharge.1 7
In Alabama, an appellate court ruled that insubordination
based upon a refusal to take a polygraph examination cannot be an
adequate basis for discharge.' 8' Similarly, in Maryland, a wrongful
discharge cause of action may be available to an employee who is
required to take a polygraph examination. 3 9 The Maryland public
policy is clearly against conditioning employment on the taking of a
polygraph examination. 4 The same public policy prohibits requiring
a polygraph for employment in West Virginia.' 4 '
Maryland has expanded the remedies available to the employee
wrongfully discharged on the basis of a polygraph examination, to
include future lost wages.' 42 Although the Act provides only for back
pay, the Maryland decision awarding future lost wages suggests that
in weighing the public policy considerations against polygraph examinations, financial awards are an appropriate means of enforcement.
In punishing an employer who has violated the Act, the punitive financial damages sought by the Secretary of Labor provide an appropriate means of enforcement, and a deterrent to the employer who
violates the public policy against polygraphs.
In situations involving statutes other than the EPPA, a reviewing court or administrative agency must make a choice between
compensating the innocent victims, and consequently compensating
the guilty as well, or not penalizing the guilty employer who coerces
employees. Since only one weapon is typically available, the enforcement or denial of disciplinary action against the employee, the
choice between compensation and punishment is a Procrustean
bed. 43 The court or agency must either cut off the feet of the inno137. Id. at 1187.
138. Hood v. Alabama State Personnel Bd., 516 So.2d 680 (Ala. App. 1987)(holding
that an employee could not be discharged for insubordination based on a refusal to take a
polygraph examination where the employer had no written policy regarding the use of polygraph exams).
139. Townsend v. L.W.M. Management, Inc., 64 Md. App. 55, 494 A.2d 239 (Ct. Spec.

App. 1985)(asserting that Maryland recognizes a cause of action for abusive discharge by an
employer of an at-will employee when motivation for discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public policy).
140. Id.
141. Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984). The West

Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that it is contrary to the public policy of West
Virginia for an employer to require or request that an employee submit to a polygraph test or

similar test as a condition of employment. Id.
142. Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212 (Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
143. In Greek mythology, Procrustes, the owner of this bed and a highway robber,
would fit every traveller into the bed by either cutting off the feet of travellers who were too
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cent employee to consistently punish the guilty employee, or stretch
the employer to take back the guilty employee to protect the innocent employee.
The Act provides the reviewing court with a choice of remedies,
and the additional weapon made available by the Secretary of Labor's action against an employer, independent of remedies available
to the employee, solves the Procrustean difficulty presented by other
statutes. The imposition by the Secretary of Labor of a civil fine and
injunction against continuing violations are divisible from the enforcement or denial of disciplinary action against the employee. An
employer who administers a polygraph examination without reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved in an incident resulting
in economic loss and, based on that examination discharges an innocent employee, is properly subject to the full panoply of penalties
available under the Act.'44 Not only can the employer be penalized
through fines and injunctions, but the innocent employee can be
compensated with reinstatement, back pay, and costs and attorney's
fees. 45 If, however, an employer improperly administers a polygraph
examination and discharges a guilty employee, the employer should
only be subject to the penalizing provisions of the Act, and not its
compensatory provisions. The penalizing provisions support the public policy against requiring employees to take polygraph examinations, while a denial of the compensatory provisions supports the
public policy against requiring employers to retain guilty employees.
Neither the EPPA nor the regulations specifically permit this
division of remedies. Under the EPPA, a literal interpretation provides the compensatory remedies to the employee who is discovered
as guilty after an improper polygraph examination. However, the
EPPA specifically vests discretion in the administration of remedies
in the state or federal court hearing the complaint. 46 This discretion
should be used to divide the remedies provided in a manner that upholds the dichotomous public policies behind polygraph legislation.
The objective of the Act was to protect innocent employees from the
inherently unreliable polygraph. 47 At the same time, the reasonable
suspicion exemption recognizes the need to permit employers to attall or stretching them as if on a rack if they were too short. M. HERZBERG, MYTHS AND
150-51 (1966).
144. Barnard & List, Defense Perspective on Individual Employment Rights, 67 NEB.

THEIR MEANING

L.

REV.

145.
146.
147.

193 (1988).
29 U.S.C.A. § 2005 (West Supp. 1989).
Id.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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tempt to control workplace theft. 148 After examining the Act's history and the purpose of both the polygraph ban and the reasonable
suspicion exception, a court could decide that division of the remedies most closely reflects these parallel legislative goals.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Employee Polygraph Protection Act was enacted to protect
innocent employees in the private sector from adverse employment
actions based solely on the inherently unreliable polygraph examination. 149 The EPPA recognizes and permits, however, the use of
polygraphs in their coercive function and, therefore, the exemption
for reasonable suspicion might induce an employer to improperly administer a polygraph test. The Act's remedial provisions should be
split when applied to employers who act upon this inducement and,
as a result, take adverse employment action against guilty employees.' 50 Those employers should be penalized with a civil fine and enjoined from continuing violations of the Act, but should not be required to compensate the employee with reinstatement, back pay and
benefits, costs and attorney's fees.
This division of remedies, within the discretion of the court
hearing the case, addresses the two public policies embodied in the
Act and its reasonable suspicion exemption. The policy behind the
Act, that of protecting innocent employees from the unreliable polygraph examination, is enforced through the punitive measures imposed upon the guilty employer. The policy behind the reasonable
suspicion exemption, that of permitting employers to discover and
control workplace theft, is enforced through the denial of its compensatory provisions (i.e. denying a reward to a guilty employee).
The proper penalty under EPPA when a guilty employee is improperly caught is the enforcement of punitive measures against the employer and the denial of compensatory remedies to the guilty
employee.

148.
149.
150.

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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